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ABSTRACT 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is used ubiquitously for navigation and timing 
synchronization purposes. Many telecommunication, finance and aviation systems rely heavily on 
GPS information for routine operations. GPS functions by relying on satellites orbiting the earth 
in very accurately predictable orbits, which are used as references to identify the positions of 
objects (receivers). Receivers calculate their positions by receiving GPS signals and calculating 
their relative distances to each of the satellites. With enough relative distances, the receiver can 
resolve its position using the method known as trilateration [1].  In this thesis, we underline the 
vulnerability of this orbiting infrastructure to spoofing attacks, by easily procurable and 
affordable software defined radios. GPS Signal spoofing is a type of malicious attack, where an 
attacker generates fake GPS signal with valid GPS properties but false navigational and/or timing 
information to fool non-suspecting receivers. These signals appear authentic and receivers end up 
processing the false signal and extracting wrong information. There are two types of GPS 
services, civilian and military. The military service is encrypted and not vulnerable to such 
attacks because the pseudorandom codes are not disclosed to the public. However, this service is 
accessible to authorized military personnel alone. All other commercial and public GPS receivers 
which form the mass of the population are vulnerable to spoofing attacks. The civilian GPS 
broadcast band is not encrypted, and this makes it easy for an attacker to recreate the signal that 
appears valid to GPS receivers.  In this thesis we implement a low cost, easy for mass-market 
application Doppler measurement based spoofing detection approach, utilizing non-specialized 
off the shelf commercial receivers. 
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1.1 Overview of the Problem 
The civilian GPS signal is completely unencrypted and provides no authentication, 
which makes it vulnerable to attacks. In (M. L. Psiaki, 2013), the authors were able to 
practically prove the vulnerability of the GPS Navigation system to spoofing attacks. Such 
attacks generate authentic appearing GPS signals with valid modulation codes, signal 
structure and frequency. However, the information contained in the signal can be 
misleading and completely fool commercial receivers in use today. The time and position 
of regular GPS receivers can be completely manipulated at the will of the 
Spoofer.  Though, there have been no officially confirmed attacks attributed to spoofing, 
according to (Saarinen, 2013), a team of researchers had been able to show that spoofing 
attacks are effective. They successfully diverted the path of an $80 million private yacht 
by seamlessly taking over its GPS signal. This was acknowledged as the first GPS spoofing 
device and made the world aware of the potential risks these vulnerabilities pose.  There 
have also been unconfirmed claims of the technology being manipulated to sabotage drones 
and could explain cases of mysterious missing planes and ships (Peterson, 2011). With the 
ubiquitous use of GPS based services, which is only expected to grow further, the misuse 
of this service and its malignant impact will only escalate. For example, spoofing could be 
used to modify the course of ships or drones to non-secure regions or interfere with 
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automated stock exchange or smart grids that utilize GPS for accurate timing information. 
The public relies on GPS for day to day navigation and trusts it fully. A Spoofer could take 
advantage of the trust in GPS to cause accidents and unnecessary traffic congestions 
altering emergency routes etc. By manipulating vehicle positions at the intersection, 
travelers could make wrong turns or run into oncoming traffic. Such an attack would 
continually be effective, and authorities would have difficulty in locating the attacker or 
neutralizing the threat.  
1.2 Literature Review 
We propose a security approach to protect vehicles against spoofing attacks by 
leveraging non-specialized equipment which can be implemented using commercially 
available GPS receivers. There are existing security approaches that detect spoofing 
attacks, however they either offer protection that is easily circumventable or require 
specialized hardware such as software defined radios. Such approaches are not easily 
implementable on a large scale. Some of the state-of-the-art protections are as proposed by 
(Ranganathan, 2016). Here a special SDR is used to detect traces of the authentic GPS 
signal in the presence of Spoofed signal. If the Spoofed signal is not closely synchronized 
with the authentic signal, there would be presence of shifted and overshadowed auxiliary 
peaks that would indicate spoofing. Commercial off the shelf receivers do not provide 
access to the acquisition phase of the GPS signal processing and this is only achievable by 
software processing of GPS signals with SDR’s that are capable of processing high 
frequency signals with fast sampling rates.  
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The authors in (M. L. Psiaki, 2013) exploit the unknown and encrypted GPS L1 P(Y) code, 
which is unpredictable and changes in real-time. Thus, the Spoofer would not be able to 
replicate it at will. The approach cross correlates the P(Y) code between two receivers, one 
trusted and the other vulnerable. A correlation threshold detects the receiver being Spoofed. 
This approach requires a trusted station and like (Ranganathan, 2016), it requires an SDR 
to extract the P(Y) code, which is not accessible in commercial receivers. (Heng & Gao, 
2014) expatiated on the concept of military code correlation devised by (M. L. Psiaki, 
2013) and were able to show that the numerical probability of detecting a spoofing attack 
increased when P(Y) code correlation was performed across multiple cooperative 
receivers. The authors were able to demonstrate that multiple low cost, low performance 
receivers can compare to or perform better than a single high-quality reference receiver 
when used to detect spoofing attacks. Other approaches that do not require specialized 
research equipment have been mentioned by (Saeed Daneshmand, 2012). Here, the authors 
demonstrated a computationally cheap approach, which makes use of an antenna array. 
The authors capitalized on the assumption that most Spoofers generate and broadcast 
multiple PRN codes from the same source, which mimic real satellites. However, the PRN 
codes are broadcasted by satellites from different positions in the constellation. The authors 
were able to demonstrate that there is expected to be different relative code phases across 
the different antennas from the different satellites depending on which antennas was closer 
to which satellite source. Since the Spoofer broadcasts from a single source, all the PRNS 
would have the same relative code phase across the antenna’s rather than a varying one and 
this could indicate spoofing. The approach is implemented in a static case and requires a 
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collection of strategically placed antennas, which limits its scalability potential. More 
simplistic detection techniques verify the expected GPS properties and ensure the signal 
properties such as the propagation strength signal quality and the direction of arrival of the 
signal are in the expected range (Heng & Gao, 2014), (Akos, 2012), which can be easily 
circumvented if the Spoofer aligns the Spoofed signal measurements with the real GPS 
properties. 
There are researchers that have proposed cryptographic based countermeasures to mitigate 
spoofing attacks, these techniques suggest validating the navigation message with the use 
of a digital key signature (Kyle Wesson, 2012). The authors were able to develop 
probabilistic GPS signal validation that constituted of cryptographic code origin 
verification based on statistical hypothesis tests. Unfortunately approaches that require 
modification of the navigation message cannot be implemented without significant 
modification to the underlying infrastructure in use by the legacy GPS system. 
Although the above-mentioned approaches are relatively strong detection methods, they 
do not provide an off the shelf detection solution. In (Tippenhauer, 2011) the idea of using 
multiple GPS receivers placed in a formation is demonstrated. This detection approach 
limits the positions from which the Spoofer can succeed in spoofing a single node without 
disturbing the established formation. This detection approach requires multiple GPS 
receivers and is feasible in a known static formation. It faces similar concerns as (M. L. 
Psiaki, 2013) and (Ranganathan, 2016) for large scale implementation. These approaches 
require raw GPS signal information at the code level to extract the P(Y) code and 
correlation coefficients. Unfortunately, commercial receivers do not provide such 
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information, therefore, existing security measures would require special SDR’s or multiple 
receivers. This limits their applicability for commercial use.  
1.3 Approach 
In this thesis we design a security approach against spoofing attacks. Our approach 
utilizes the Doppler property of wave propagation as a mechanism for spoofing detection. 
The Doppler effect is a shift in the nominal signal frequency (1.5424GHz) due to the 
relative motion between the receiver and the GPS satellites. Most commercial GPS 
receivers provide information on the Doppler frequency, which is measured by scanning 
an additional frequency range until the signal is acquired. We make use of the Doppler 
frequency acquired from the receiver’s acquisition phase and correlate it with the 
calculated Doppler frequency at the receiver based on the satellite and receiver motion to 
detect inconsistencies. The table below shows a list of receivers that provide the acquired 
Doppler frequency and the navigation message in digital form. 
Brand Device Cost 
U-blox NEO-M8T $75 (Shop, 
n.d.)
SkyTraq NS-RAW $70 (Store, 
n.d.)
NVS RasPiGNSS $170 
(Fasching, 
n.d.)
Swift Piksi Multi GNSS Module $595 
(Navigation, 
n.d.)
NovAtel OEM625S unknown 
Table 1 GPS receivers with acquired Doppler frequency and Navigation Message 
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Doppler based GPS signal verification has already been used in (Leen A. van Mastrigt, 
2015) as a security measure to detect fake signals. However, just utilizing the Doppler 
effect is not enough. The motion of the satellite can be predicted by the Spoofer by 
adjusting the output frequency of the fake signal accordingly to avoid detection. Therefore, 
to further strengthen the security, we introduce forced unpredictable, yet monitored motion 
on the GPS receiver, which would make it very difficult for less advanced Spoofers to 
predict. We assume a scenario where the Spoofer is targeting the public and has a poor 
estimate of the velocity of the vehicles in the vicinity. For this approach to work, we need 
access to accurate vehicle speed to predict the Doppler with user motion accounted for. 
There is significant error accumulation when measuring the receiver velocity using Inertial 
Measurement Units (IMU). IMU’s accumulate error over time based on the orientation 
error of the sensor. Very accurate orientation estimate is needed to distinguish the 
acceleration due to gravity from the physical acceleration of the sensor. Even errors as 
small as 0.1 degrees in orientation can lead to velocity errors of up to 0.17m/s in 10 seconds. 
The figure below shows the error accumulation of an IMU based on various orientation 
errors for a generic IMU from CH Robotics. 
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Figure 1. IMU Error accumulation for velocity and position (Robotics, n.d.) 
To get more accurate and reliable velocity measurements, we make use of the precise 
digital vehicle speed information provided by the OBD system installed in modern 
vehicles. With reliable user velocity, we can monitor the receiver motion and predict the 
Doppler values in this dynamic situation. Unlike most security measures, our approach 
does not require any special software defined radio or an array of receivers or antennas. 
We utilize commercially available GPS receivers which provide Doppler measurements. 
The approach is implementable using a single precise GPS receiver coupled with a 
dedicated onboard diagnostic reader. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM 
2.1 History 
GPS emerged during the sputnik era, when scientists tracked satellites by 
measuring the shifts in radio signal frequency known as the Doppler effect. In the early 
1970’s, the US Department of Defense (USDOD) decided to create a robust and stable 
satellite-based navigation system.  By 1978, the USDOD launched its first GPS satellite 
system (NAVSTAR) and by 1993, all 24 satellites were in orbit and the GPS system 
became fully operational (Mai, 2017). The GPS satellites were originally launched into 
orbit by the USDOD for military use only, however by 1980, the service was made 
available for civilians but, with a system known as Selective Availability (SA). This meant 
that two signals were generated by the satellites, one encrypted and to be used only by the 
military, while the other civilian signal was intentionally degraded to reduce its accuracy 
by magnitudes more than the military signal. This was done out of the fear that the service 
could be used by malicious individuals for harmful purposes.  However, by May of 2000, 
the SA degradation was turned off due to economic reasons.  
Today, the use of satellite-based positioning is widespread, and its usage is exponentially 
expected to rise in the future with more IOT devices using localization services. GPS 
navigation is being used by aviation industry for monitoring air traffic, by the judiciary to 
surveil convicts using GPS based ankle monitors, for critical timing synchronization in 
financial, power, telecommunication and computer network systems. GPS is also utilized 
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in time stamping security videos, traffic light timing synchronization, tracking cargoes and 
goods for transportation companies (M. L. Psiaki, 2013).  
While GPS is the most widely utilized satellite navigational system, there are other 
competitors from Europe and Asia that offer similar but limited navigation coverage.  
2.1.1 GLONASS 
Like GPS, the GLONASS was developed by the Russian military in the 1970’s and 
has been accessible to the public from the 1980’s and was fully completed with a 
constellation of 24 satellites in 2011. To date, GPS and GLONASS are the only complete 
GPS constellations with coverage throughout the globe. However, GPS is more accurate 
in most parts of the world, except in the northern latitudes, which makes sense, as Russia 
is home to some of the highest latitudes on earth  (Agrawal, 2018) 
2.1.2 Galileo (EU) 
Galileo was developed by the European Union in 2011, currently operating 14 
satellites. The constellation is expected to reach full maturity with a complete constellation 
of 24 satellites by the year 2020 to compete with GPS and GLONASS. The service is 
currently used by the European government for emergency response services on road and 
rail. Currently Galileo provides the most accurate positioning at higher altitudes when 
compared to other navigation systems. 
2.1.3 Beidou 
Beidou is China’s Navigational Satellite System (BDS) and has been on the rise 
since early 2000. The system currently has 22 satellites in space and is still limited in 
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coverage when compared to GPS. However, it is expected to have a completed 
constellation by 2020 with increased accuracy. 
Despite all the available constellations in orbit, GPS is the most accurate and widely 
utilized satellite navigation system in use today. 
2.2 Basic Concepts 
2.2.1 Reference Coordinate System 
For GPS satellite and receiver position to be related, they must be in the same 
reference coordinate frame. Since the receiver is on the earth surface and the Satellites are 
in orbit, their coordinate systems are different.  
For satellites in orbits, the Earth-centered-inertial (ECI) coordinate system is suitable for 
determining their positions (Kaplan, 1996). The origin of this coordinate frame is the center 
of mass of the earth and thus, the motion dynamics could be modelled as though the ECI 
system was unaccelerated. For the GPS receiver, it is more convenient to use a reference 
frame that rotates with the earth. Such a coordinate frame is known as Earth-centered Earth-
fixed (ECEF) system. In this frame, if the receiver is not moving relative to the earth, then 
it is static in the ECEF coordinate system as well. 
Since the natural coordinate system for the orbit is ECI and for the receiver on the earth 
surface is ECEF, it is convenient to compute the Satellite positions in ECI and then convert 
to ECEF, resulting in the receiver position being in the ECEF system. 
2.2.2 GPS positioning 
GPS receivers utilize the known speed of light together with the time of travel of 
the GPS signal to estimate the range between the receiver and the satellite. The GPS 
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satellite time stamps the beginning of each frame with its internal atomic clock. Thus, on 
receiving the signal, the receiver can deduce the time of travel and estimate its relative 
range from the satellite. When the receiver simultaneously acquires and processes relative 
range information from 4 satellites, the receiver can solve a 4 variable simultaneous 
equation. The nonlinear equation would solve to provide the three-dimensional coordinates 
of the receiver (x, y, and z) in ECEF coordinate frame, as well as accurate GPS time. An 
example of the principle behind Satellite based positioning is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Principle of Satellite Positioning 
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Once the receiver can deduce the positions of the satellite and the receiver-to-satellite 
distances 𝑅 , circles can be drawn around each satellite with radius 𝑅. In three dimensions, 
instead of circles there would be spheres of radius 𝑅. As can be seen from Figure 2, The 
point at which 3 or more circles intersect would be the unambiguous receiver position.  
2.3 GPS Components 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) was created as a mapping technology, which uses 
know positions of satellites in orbit to map unknown positions on land, sea, air and space, 
relative to the earth center. The system comprises of 24 orbiting satellites in 6 orbital 
planes. Each satellite is in an approximately circular, semi-synchronous orbit, at an altitude 
of 20.2 × 106𝑘𝑚. The system is designed in such a way that a minimum of 4 satellites are
visible from any point on the globe. 
The GPS infrastructure comprises of the space, control and user segments. The space 
segment comprises of the operating satellites, while the user segment consists of GPS 
receivers that receive signals from the space segment to extract navigational data. The 
control segment monitors and keeps track of the space segment. It adjusts satellite clocks, 
account for gravitational and other orbital disturbances and updates navigational data. The 
figure below shows a pictorial representation of the various GPS components.  
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Figure 3 GPS System overview 
2.3.1 The Control Segment 
The GPS control segment consists of a large set of networked ground stations that 
track GPS satellites monitor transmission signal and provide updates and commands to the 
space stations. The current Operational Control Segment consists of a master control 
station, an alternate master control station and 11 other command and control antennas and 
16 monitoring sites located at various parts of the globe (NOAA, 2017).  
The Monitor stations utilize advanced GPS receivers to track GPS satellites, collect 
navigation signals and measurements, which are fed to the master control station for 
addressing. 
The master control station is the brain of the control segment. It uses the global 
monitoring stations to compute the precise position of the satellites and is responsible for 
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providing commands and updates to the GPS constellation. The commands instruct the 
satellites to perform maintenance and resolve anomalies that cause the satellites to drift 
from the optimal constellations. The updates are made to the navigation message to correct 
satellite position information and atmospheric conditions. 
Finally, the ground antennas are also spread out through the globe and receive instructions, 
update commands and messages from the master control station. The ground antennas are 
responsible for updating the space stations with the instructions received form the master 
control station.  
2.3.2 The Space Segment 
This segment consists of the GPS satellites in orbit, which serve as the reference 
for global positioning. Each GPS satellite broadcasts navigational data on different carrier 
channels in the L1, L2 and L5 bands (Vatansever, 2017) . The L1 band is the most 
commonly used, and most commercial receivers are designed to process and extract 
information from it. The L1 carrier’s center frequency is 1.57542GHz and it consists of the 
P and C/A PRN codes modulated on it with frequencies 10.23MHz and 1.023MHz 
respectively. Although these codes appear as noise, they are carefully crafted series of ones 
and zeroes that help distinguish signals from different satellite stations. The P(Y) code is 
encrypted and can only be decrypted by the military. The C/A code is a 1023-bit sequence, 
ten times slower than the military P(Y) code but it is unencrypted and used by the public. 
The PRN codes play a very important role in identifying the satellite the signal was 
received from. Since all the satellites transmit at the same fundamental GPS frequency, the 
PRN codes are used to distinguish and track individual satellite information. These codes 
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are designed to have very low cross-correlation and are termed perpendicular to each other. 
Systems which transmit multiple messages at the same frequency such as GPS are called 
Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) systems (Kai Borre, 2007). Figure 3. shows an 
overview of the various GPS signal components 
Figure 4. GPS Signal overview 
For a receiver to compute its position, it only needs to listen on the L1 band for the C/A 
codes. The 50Hz navigation message is modulated on top of both the P and C/A code. It 
consists of a 1500-bit long data frame which is composed of 5 subframes. The first three 
subframes consist of the satellite clock and ephemeris, while the other two subframes 
consist of the almanac. The ephemeris and almanac are used to calculate the position of the 
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satellites in space. The almanac is a less precise but long-term estimate of satellite 
parameters updated every six days, while the ephemeris is more precise orbital information 
and is updated by the control stations every two hours (GMV, 2011). 
2.3.3 The User Segment 
The user segment refers to the consumers of the GPS navigational and timing 
services. This mainly constitutes of the various types of GPS receivers. Most receivers in 
use today are multichannel receivers that track the C/A code on L1 band to recover the 
encoded navigation message and resolve position, velocity and time solutions (Jan Van 
Sickle, n.d.).  
2.4 GPS Operation Principle 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) utilizes multiple satellites 𝑆𝑖, which are 
strategically located at known positions 𝑃𝑖
𝑠  ∊ 𝑅3. GPS Satellites are designed with
accurately synchronized atomic clocks with no deviation from the absolute system time 𝑡𝑠. 
They broadcast signals with valid navigation messages 𝑛𝑖(𝑡) and each of these satellite 
signals have very low cross correlation with each other. The speed at which the signal is 
propagated is the same as speed of light 𝑐 = 3 × 108𝑚/𝑠.  
With the receiver 𝑅 located at an unknown position 𝑃 ∊ 𝑅3 identifying its position 
by receiving the combined signal from all visible satellites, we can represent its position as 
a function of the satellite positions and time as shown in equation 1 








Where 𝐴𝑖 represents the attenuation factor the signal goes through on its journey from the 
satellites at 𝑃𝑖
𝑠 to the receiver at position 𝑃. |𝑃𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑃| represents the separation between 𝑃𝑖
𝑠
and 𝑃, whereas    𝛿(𝑃, 𝑡𝑠) denotes the background noise present in the signal when received 
by the receiver.   
Figure 5. GPS Positioning: A receiver listening to signals from multiple satellites 
Figure 5. can be used as a reference to identify the different parameters involved in the 
trilateration of the user position. Given the signal transmission time provided by each 
satellite in the navigation message, and the relative phase offset of the C/A code, the 
receiver can then calculate the relative time delay from each satellite.  Which can then be 
used to estimate the range between each satellite and the receiver 
𝑑𝑖 = |𝑃𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑃| (2)
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As described in Figure 2, once three ranges 𝑑𝑖 are known, the position of the receiver 𝑃 can 
be deduced. All satellites utilize atomic clocks which are very accurate and synchronized 
with all other satellites and the time of transmission have no offset to each other. However, 
GPS receivers on the other hand are not designed with atomic clocks due to the high cost 
involved. Therefore, the clocks on the receiver 𝑉 are not synchronized to the same time 
frame as the absolute GPS clocks and will be off by a clock offset  𝜎. The receiver and GPS 
clocks can be related by the equation 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑠 +  𝜎, where 𝑡 is the receiver time, 𝑡𝑠 is the 
satellite time. Equation 1 will now become 
𝑟(𝑃, 𝑡𝑠) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑖(𝑡 − 𝑡
𝑠 −  𝜎) +  𝛿(𝑃, 𝑡𝑠)
𝑖
 (3)
Also, the range 𝑑𝑖 inferred in Equation 2, will also be affected by the clock offset and 
would include an offset ∆ = 𝑐. 𝜎. Therefore, the range estimated will be known as the 
pseudorange 𝐷𝑖 and is related to the true range 𝑑𝑖 by the following equation 
𝐷𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 +  ∆ (4) 
With the introduction of the receiver clock offset, the number of variables increase from 
solving for just position, to solving for position and time. Therefore, a minimum of four 
pseudo ranges would be required for the receiver to solve for accurate position and time 
offset. The ephemeris present in the navigation message provides the orbital parameters 
required to calculate the satellites position 𝑃𝑠 at any given time of transmission 𝑡𝑠. 
𝑃𝑠(𝑡𝑠) = (𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑠, 𝑧𝑠). The unknown receiver position and time of reception that needs to 
be solved for can be denoted as 𝑃(𝑡) = (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧). With ranges from four GPS satellites, the 
four simultaneous equations could be solved 
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(𝐷𝐼 − ∆)
2  =  (𝑥 − 𝑥1
𝑠)2  − (𝑦 − 𝑦1
𝑠)2 − (𝑧 − 𝑥1
𝑠)2 (5a) 
(𝐷2 − ∆)
2  =  (𝑥 − 𝑥2
𝑠)2  − (𝑦 − 𝑦2
𝑠)2 − (𝑧 − 𝑥2
𝑠)2 (5b) 
(𝐷3 − ∆)
2  =  (𝑥 − 𝑥3
𝑠)2  − (𝑦 − 𝑦3
𝑠)2 − (𝑧 − 𝑥3
𝑠)2 (5c) 
(𝐷4 − ∆)
2  =  (𝑥 − 𝑥4
𝑠)2  − (𝑦 − 𝑦4
𝑠)2 − (𝑧 − 𝑥4
𝑠)2 (5d) 
The four simultaneous equations would be solved with data from 4 satellites and the higher 
order nonlinear equations can be solved by numerical methods such as Newtons or least-
mean-square approach (Kai Borre, 2007). We describe the least mean square approach for 
solving for the user position below. 
2.5 Least-Mean-Square Approach 
The Least Mean Square algorithm is a recursive algorithm based on the principles 
of steepest descent and belongs to a group of algorithms referred to as the stochastic 
gradient methods (Kai Borre, 2007). For brevity, let us represent the actual unknown 
position and time vectors as 𝑣 = [𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑐𝜎]𝑇 where 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 are the user position, 𝑐 is the 
speed of light and 𝜎 is the clock offset between the receiver and the satellite clocks. Let us 
assume an estimated (initial guess) user position vector 𝑣 = [𝑥, ?̂?, ?̂?, 𝑐?̂?]. Let 𝐷?̂? be the
theoretical pseudorange measurement based on user position 𝑣. Therefore, equation 4 
becomes 
𝐷?̂? =  𝐷?̂?(?̂?) = |𝑑?̂? + ∆̂(?̂?)| (6)
For simplicity we can have the corresponding pseudorange vector based on the actual and 
estimated user positions as 𝐷(𝑣) = [𝐷1, 𝐷2, 𝐷3, 𝐷4]
𝑇 and ?̂?(?̂?) = [𝐷1̂, 𝐷2̂, 𝐷3̂, 𝐷4̂]
𝑇
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respectively. Based on the principle of the first order Taylor series expansion, the 
theoretical pseudorange vector ?̂? can be approximated at any given point (𝑣 + ∆𝑣) as 




Where 𝑣 is the point of linearization and ∆𝑣 is an arbitrary vector representing the 
correction term between 𝑣 and 𝑣. For a solution to be reached, the absolute value of the 
deviation ∆𝑣 must be minimized. This will result in 𝑣  ≃  𝑣. The final objective is to deduce 
the solution vector 𝑣 based on an estimation of 𝑣, which will converge when ∆𝑣 is 
minimized. Therefore, the correction term ∆𝑣 can be calculated by substituting equation 7 
with  




Equation 8 can now be solved by using the least squares method as: 















(?̂? − 𝐷) (9) 
With the correction term estimated from Equation 8, the estimated solution vector 𝑣 can be 
updated by adding the correction term to it. For every iteration, the estimate becomes closer 
to the actual solution and the correction term ∆𝑣 would further reduce. This is based on the 
principle of gradient decent, with every repetition using the corrected 𝑣 would cause the 
error to gradually diminish. With a very small correction term, a very close estimate of the 
user position would have been calculated. 
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2.6 GPS Receivers 
The main objective of the GPS receiver is to extract the pseudorandom codes and 
the navigation messages from the complex signal received from GPS satellites. A brief 
description of the details involved in the processing and extraction of GPS signals is given 
here based on the models described by (Misra, 2001). GPS receivers get position and time 
information by using the concept of trilateration. For accurate navigation, the receiver 
needs to calculate its distance relative to four GPS satellites in orbit, whose positions can 
be calculated by using the ephemeris. The first three are used to solve for the unknown 
𝑥, 𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑧 coordinates of the receiver in the Earth Centered Earth Fixed (ECEF) frame, 
while the fourth satellite in the equation solves for GPS time as described in Section 2.4. 
Receivers operate by passing through four main processing blocks. 
2.6.1 The RF Front-End 
The front-end comprises of the antenna module which receives the GPS signal and 
an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) to convert the signal to digital form. The antenna 
receives GPS signals from the electromagnetic spectrum and converts it into electrical 
currents and voltages. Due to the very weak strength of the signal, it is amplified with a 
low-noise amplifier (LNA) unit and in most cases the carrier frequency is down converted 
to an Intermediate Frequency which is easier to process with lower stress on the 
computational hardware (Kai Borre, 2007). All interfering signals present in neighboring 
and adjacent frequencies are filtered out. The process of filtering out these disturbing 
signals is known as conditioning. The signals are then digitized by an analog-to-digital 
converter (ADC) and are ready to be passed through the acquisition channels where signals 
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from individual satellites are isolated and processed. Figure 6 gives a simple block diagram 
of the main processing blocks for a GPS receiver from reception of position and time 
estimation. 
Figure 6. GPS receiver overview (Misra, 2001) 
2.6.2 The Acquisition Module 
The Acquisition block is responsible for detecting the presence of satellite data in 
the received signal. It does so by making use of a Delay Locked Loop (DLL) to properly 
align the pseudorandom codes (C/A) with a local replica generated by the receiver. The 
replica code is generated locally as the product of two 10-bit shift registers G1 and G2, that 
are generated by a maximum-length linear shift register of 10 stages (Tsui, 2000).  Once 
the preprocessing is complete, the acquisition block performs a scan for satellite PRN 
codes. The scan is over a frequency range of ± 10𝐾𝐻𝑧 (Tsui, 2000) to ensure all possible 
Doppler frequencies offsets are accounted for. The DLL constantly aligns the replica codes 
with the incoming data for correlation beyond an acceptable threshold. The different C/A 
codes are carefully designed to be perpendicular to each other, thus there would be very 
low correlation between non-identical codes or non-aligned codes.  
However, with the satellites in constant and precise orbital motion around the receiver, 
there is the presence of a frequency shift known as the Doppler effect due to which the 
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frequency received by the receiver is shifted. Thus, a two-dimensional search is performed 
in this phase to search for Doppler frequencies and C/A codes. Once strong correlation is 
observed, then the corresponding satellite with the PRN code and Doppler frequency is 
acquired. Each satellite signal has a difference C/A code with a different starting time 
(phase). This starting time is of significance to the tracking module, since the navigation 
message bits are identified based on multiple periods of the C/A code. Therefore, the 
acquisition module uses the start time of the C/A code to despread the spectrum, converting 
the output into a continuous wave (CW) signal, whose carrier frequency can be deduced. 
The tracking module is then forwarded the start time of the C/A code and the carrier 
frequency for extracting receiver information. Figure 7 shows a pictorial representation of 
the 2D Doppler and PRN correlation search. 
Figure 7. GPS Signal acquisition 
The peak in the figure represents the acquisition of the GPS satellite signal with PRN 
number 09 at a Doppler frequency of 1𝐾𝐻𝑧 and a code phase 2,500 seconds. 
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2.6.3 The Tracking Module 
The tracking module as the name implies keeps track of the code phase and the 
frequency as the signal changes with time. The code phase is tracked in a Delay lock loop 
(DLL) just like in the acquisition phase, but this time, the corresponding PRN is already
known. It re-aligns the signal if it has been shifted by re-aligning it to closely shifted 
replicas of the already known PRN. The replicas are normally shifted by about 𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑓 chip. 
The tracking phase operates on the signal in real-time and continuously updates all 
changes. If the receiver loses track of a satellite the cycle must back track to the acquisition 
phase and reacquire the satellite to proceed (Kai Borre, 2007). 
2.6.4 The Position, Velocity and Time (PVT) Module 
 The extracted navigation message includes the signal transmission time, which is 
generated by the satellite and very accurate. To estimate the user position, the receiver first 
estimates the satellite position at the time of transmission using the ephemeris. Secondly, 
the signal transmission and reception times are used to estimate the receiver range. It should 
be noted that the received time is based on the receiver’s clock which is error prone. 
Therefore, the range estimated is known as the pseudorange. Pseudorange from 4 satellites 
can be used to estimate the receiver’s position by using basic Pythagoras theorem. (5a), 
(5b), (5c) and (5d) can be solved by using the relative range information to estimate the 
clock error, true range, position and absolute time 
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CHAPTER THREE 
GPS ATTACK MODEL 
3.1 GPS Spoofing Model 
A spoofing attack can be used to deceive GPS receivers into calculating false 
position and timing information. We assume that the Spoofer can receive the authentic GPS 
signals and is aware of the GNSS implementation details, using which, realistic appearing 
GPS signals could be generated. Such a signal would have valid PRN codes, frequency, 
signal strengths and message structure. GPS spoofing attacks can be broken down into two 
main stages. The first is the takeover, the Spoofer causes the receiver to switch over from 
the authentic signals to the fake signal. This phase can either be a smooth or forceful 
takeover. The smooth takeover starts out by sending signals synchronized with the 
authentic signals and then slowly overpowers the original causing the receiver to lock onto 
it. This type of attack requires real-time information about the receiver’s location and 
specialized hardware to be able to synchronize the fake signal to the authentic signal being 
transmitted. A brute force takeover is easier, the Spoofer simply increases the strength of 
its signal, jamming the authentic signals and causing the receiver to lost track of the 
authentic signals and lock on to the stronger fake signals. Once a Spoofer has taken over, 
the second stage of the attack begins. Here, the victim receiver is manipulated by modifying 
the navigation message or delaying the signal causing the receiver to solve for false 
position and/or time. For this thesis we limit our scope to the capabilities of the publicly 
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accessible opensource spoofing library, the GPS-SDR-SIM (Takuji Ebinuma, 2018), 
discussed in section 3.2 
3.2 GPS Attack Setup 
Here we describe the details of the possible types of attacks a GPS Spoofer can 
carry out on vulnerable GPS receivers. The underlying principle behind the operation of 
GPS is the satellite position and synchronized GPS time.  Since the GPS civilian spreading 
codes and transmission frequencies are overtly known, the Spoofer can utilize this 
information to create authentic looking GPS signals with custom information intended to 
deceive the receiver. Below we describe the ways in which a Spoofer can incorporate 
wrong information and generate fake signals. 
3.2.1 Timing Attack 
The spreading codes are received by the GPS receiver in the acquisition phase using 
the delay locked loop. As described earlier, this process repeatedly aligns the incoming 
collections of C/A codes with the corresponding replica to keep track of the individual 
satellites. The key information here is the amount of time it takes to identify the start of a 
C/A code. This time represents the pseudorange of the satellites relative to one another. 
The Spoofer can spread out or shrink this time in the fake signal at will. On receiving such 
a corrupted signal, the receiver would calculate wrong pseudoranges to the available 
satellites. This would be used in equations 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d to in turn solve for wrong 
receiver position and/or time.   
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3.2.2 Ephemeris Attack 
The ephemeris data shown in Table 2 provides satellite and orbital parameters that 
are used to calculate the position of GPS Satellites in orbit. The Spoofer can create fake 
spoofing signals and meddle with the ephemeris variables to misinform the receiver of the 
satellites actual position with false coordinates. These false coordinates will cause the 
receiver to solve for false positional information as well.  Figure 8 shows a pictorial 
representation of how tampering with the navigation message can cause the receiver to 
calculate false satellite and user positions. 
Figure 8. GPS Spoofing 
The corrupted ephemeris can cause the receiver to position itself relative to wrongly 
positioned satellites and in turn resolve a wrong PVT solution. 
3.3 Controlled Spoofing 
Civilian GPS is vulnerable to spoofing attacks as described in 3.1. Here, we 
describe the technology utilized to demonstrate the effectiveness of GPS spoofing while 
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ensuring that we abide by the legal constraints to experimenting with such attacks. To 
proceed with such an attack, software defined radios (SDR’s) such as the USRP and 
hackRF can be used as frontends to broadcast signals at GPS nominal frequencies. To 
demonstrate the effectiveness of easily implementable and portable spoofing devices, we 
made use of the Raspberry Pi 3 and the HackRF to transmit simulated GPS data generated 
by the GPS-SDR-SIM (Takuji Ebinuma, 2018) to successfully spoof an isolated GPS 
receiver and convinced it to think it was moving at a location off by several miles. The 
receiver location can be Spoofed to any arbitrary point on the globe using this setup. 
Interfering with GPS signal in open uncontrolled space for any purpose is illegal and 
punishable offence (M. L. Psiaki, 2013). To conduct our spoofing tests, we made use of 
the hackRF One and the GPS-SDR-SIM. The hackRF is an easily acquirable software 
defined radio available on amazon for about a 300 USD. The GPS-SDR-SIM in an 
opensource GPS simulation library that creates digital GPS signal with custom position 
and time. The GPS-SDR-SIM creates binaries with valid GPS navigation messages and 
PRN codes that can be broadcasted by the hackRF at the GPS nominal frequency of 
1.5745𝑀𝐻𝑧. The hackRF broadcasts this fake signal into space and makes it accessible to 
nearby GPS receivers. To ensure all our tests were controlled and did not affect nearby 
receivers, we directly wired the hackRF output to the GPS receiver, by passing the antenna 
and minimizing emanated electromagnetic signal. Furthermore, the setup of the hackRF 
and the receiver were boxed-in and wrapped with aluminum foil to shield any signal 
leakage and ensure there was no interference with any nearby receivers. The figures below 
show the setup of the hackRF coupled with the Raspberry pi for the spoofing test. 
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Figure 9. HackRF directly connected to the GPS receiver with a SM2 connector 
30 





4.1 Doppler Frequency 
The Doppler frequency can be predicted accurately by using the motion vectors of 
the satellite and the receiver. The Doppler equation lets us predict the GPS Doppler 
frequency with a nearly constant atmospheric and receiver clock errors (Leen A. van 
Mastrigt, 2015).  
𝐹𝑟 =  𝐹𝑡  . (1 − 𝑉𝑟/𝑐)  (10) 
where 𝐹𝑡 is the GPS center frequency, Fr is the received frequency and 𝑉𝑟 is the relative 
velocity vector between the satellite and the receiver along their line of sight.  
4.2 Information Extraction 
To extract and process satellite information, we make use of the Neo-M8T Ublox 
concurrent GNSS timing module (u-blox, 2016). This is a high-performance and low-
power GNSS module, which processes and provides digital GPS navigation message 
information. The module provides a large dataset of information adhering to the Ubox 
binary protocol (UBX) (u-blox, 2016). To process the binary information, we customized 
the open source C++ library provided by GAVLab (Chris Collins, 2015). By making use 
of the header file, we were able to identify navigation message blocks in the incoming 
information and extract the satellite transmission times and ephemeris variables into a C++ 
structure in real-time. Table 2 shows the components of the ephemeris data. The Ublox 
receiver also provides access to the Doppler frequency acquired from the acquisition phase. 
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Our goal is to make use of the measured Doppler and compare it to predictions made based 
on the relative motion between the receiver and the satellite.  
The frequency of the navigation message is 50Hz and the entirety of the message comprises 
of 25 subframes. Each subframe is transmitted at an interval of 6 seconds and the complete 
navigation message is received in 12.5 seconds. In decoding the message, the first step is 
identifying the start of the subframe, which is represented by an 8-bit long preamble. This 
preamble serves as a signature and appears at the beginning of every subframe (i.e. it 
repeats every 6 seconds as well). Each subframe consists of 300 bits, which are 10 30-bit 
words. The first two words of each subframe are knows as the telemetry (TLM) and Hand 
over world (HOW). The HOW contains a truncated version (17 MSB) of the TOW (Time 
of Week) which represents the total number of seconds passed since the last GPS week 
with precision of 1.5s. This time corresponds to the time of transmission of the next 
subframe and the time of transmission of the current subframe could be derived by 
multiplying the truncated time by 6 and subtracting 6s from it (Kai Borre, 2007).  The 
structure of the navigation message is shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 11. The Navigation message structure 
The navigation message parameters are extracted according to the ICD-GPS-200 
standards. The first three subframes of each frame consist of the Ephemeris, satellite 
clock and clock correction parameters. Table 2 describes the ephemeris variables 
used in calculating the position of the satellite in orbit.  
𝑡𝑜𝑒 Ephemeris reference time 
µ0 mean anomaly at reference time 𝑡𝑜𝑒 (semicircle). 
△ 𝑛  mean motion difference from computed value (semicircle/s) 
𝑒 eccentricity of the satellite orbit 
𝑡𝑜𝑒 reference time ephemeris. 
𝐶𝑢𝑠, 𝐶𝑢𝑠 amplitude of the sine and cosine harmonic correction term to the 
argument of latitude, respectively 
𝐶𝑟𝑠, 𝐶𝑟𝑐 amplitude of the sine and cosine harmonic correction term to the 
orbit radius, respectively 
𝐶𝑖𝑠, 𝐶𝑖𝑐 amplitude of the sine and cosine harmonic correction term to the 
angle of inclination, respectively. 
𝛺0̇ longitude of ascending node of orbit plane at weekly epoch. 
𝛺0 rate of the right ascension. 
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𝑖 inclination angle at reference time 
𝑤0 argument of perigee 
𝑖̇ rate of inclination angle 
𝐴 Semi-major axis 
Table 2. Ephemeris Data 
4.3 Satellite Motion 
The ephemeris information can be used to calculate the position and velocity of the 
GPS satellite from which it was received (Fu Zhu, 2016). The ephemeris consists of orbital 
parameters that completely define the orbit according to celestial physics orbital equations 
(Kai Borre, 2007). The figure below describes the fundamental orbital parameters that are 
crucial to calculate the position of a celestial body orbiting a center according to (Kai Borre, 
2007). 
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Figure 12 The Keplerian orbit elements (Kai Borre, 2007) 
The Keplerian orbit parameters of the earth centered at 𝐶, where 𝑎 represents the 
semi-major axis, 𝑒 signifies the measure of eccentricity, 𝑖 is the measure of inclination of 
the orbit 𝛺 is the right ascension of the ascending node 𝐾, 𝑤 represents the argument of 
perigee and 𝑓 is the true anomaly. The satellite broadcast ephemeris contains time-
dependent and accurate orbital parameters which could be processed through the following 
equations to yield the required variables necessary for calculating the satellite position 
(Tsui, 2000) 
1. Satellite position in orbital plane
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• Time elapsed since reference time 𝑡𝑜𝑒 𝑡𝑗 = 𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜𝑒 
• With the semi major axis 𝐴 and the mean angle velocity correction 𝛥𝑛
known from the ephemeris, the mean angle velocity can be calculated by




 𝐺𝑀 is the universal earths gravitational constant: 
𝐺𝑀 = 3.986005 × 1014 𝑚3/𝑠2 
• The mean anomaly µ𝑗 at time 𝑡𝑗 can be calculated by
µ𝑗 = µ𝑜 + 𝑛𝑡𝑗 
Where µ𝑜 is the mean anomaly at the satellite reference time 𝑡𝑜𝑒 
• The eccentricity anomaly 𝐸𝑗 can now be deduced by solving the non-linear
equation iteratively
𝐸𝑗 = µ𝑗 + 𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑗 
Where 𝑒 is the eccentricity of the satellite orbit present in the ephemeris. 
• The true anomaly 𝑓 of the GPS satellite can be calculated using the
equation
𝑓 =  tan−1
√1 − 𝑒2 sin 𝐸𝑗
cos 𝐸𝑗 − 𝑒 
2. Calculate orbital parameters with corrections at 𝒕𝒋
• The XY plane is to be rotated by the longitude of the ascending node 𝛺,
which represents the angular position of the satellite moving along its
orbit. 𝛺𝑗 at time 𝑡𝑗 is derived by
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𝛺𝑗 = 𝛺0 + (?̇? − ?̇?𝑒)𝑡𝑗 − ?̇?𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑒 
Where 𝛺0 and ?̇? are longitude of the ascending node at the ephemeris 
reference time and the rate of 𝛺0 respectively. ?̇?𝑒 is the standard rate of 
earth rotation according to WGS-84 (?̇?𝑒 = 7.29211514 × 10
−5 𝑟𝑎𝑑/𝑠)
• The argument of perigee 𝑤𝑗 at 𝑡𝑗 is
𝑤𝑗 = 𝑤 + 𝑓𝑗 + 𝐶𝑤𝑐 cos 2(𝑤 + 𝑓𝑗) + 𝐶𝑤𝑠 sin 2(𝑤 + 𝑓𝑗)  
where 𝑤 is the argument of perigee provided at 𝑡𝑜𝑒 and 𝐶𝑤𝑐 and 𝐶𝑤𝑠 
represents the magnitude of the cosine and sine harmonic correction term 
for the argument of latitude. 
• The inclination of the orbit 𝑖𝑗 is defined as
𝑖𝑗 = 𝑖0 + 𝑖?̇?𝑗 + 𝐶𝑖𝑐 cos 2(𝑤 + 𝑓𝑗) + 𝐶𝑖𝑠 sin 2(𝑤 + 𝑓𝑗) 
where 𝑖0 is the inclination at 𝑡𝑜𝑒 and 𝑖 ̇is the rate of change of inclination, 
𝐶𝑖𝑐 and 𝐶𝑖𝑠 are the sine and cosine harmonic corrections terms for the angle 
of inclination respectively. 
• The radial distance of the satellite 𝑟𝑗 is calculated by
𝑟𝑗 = 𝐴(1 − 𝑒 cos 𝐸𝑗) + 𝐶𝑟𝑐 cos 2(𝑤 + 𝑓𝑗) + 𝐶𝑟𝑠 sin 2(𝑤 + 𝑓𝑗) 
Where 𝐶𝑟𝑐 and 𝐶𝑟𝑠 are the cosine and sine harmonic correction terms for 
the orbit radius. 






𝑟𝑗 (cos 𝑤𝑗 cos 𝛺𝑗 − sin 𝑤𝑗 cos 𝑖𝑗 sin 𝛺𝑗) 
𝑟𝑗 (cos 𝑤𝑗 sin 𝛺𝑗 −  sin 𝑤𝑗 cos 𝑖𝑗 cos 𝛺𝑗
𝑟𝑗 sin 𝑤𝑗 sin 𝑖𝑗
] 
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Assuming all required information is available, the corresponding Doppler effect present 
in the GPS signal can be calculated. Having access to the Doppler frequency measurements 
from the Ublox receiver, and the expected Doppler predicted by using the ephemeris, we 
can make a comparison to detect spoofing attacks from Spoofers that are not able to 
incorporate the expected Doppler frequencies into the Spoofed signals. 
We utilized 4 different GPS receivers simultaneously and recorded the measured Doppler 
frequency provided by them. It was observed that an offset existed between the predicted 
and the measured Doppler frequencies. However, the correlation was clear, and the offset 
was almost constant across all the satellites for each individual receiver. Another 
interesting deduction was the difference in the acquired Doppler measurements from the 
different receivers, although they received signals from the same GPS satellites, the 
measured Dopplers across the different receivers were different. An almost constant offset 
existed across all the different satellites and the offset was different for different receivers. 
However, these errors were almost constant in their measurements across all the satellites 
since the hardware and atmosphere used for the various satellites. Therefore, to eliminate 
these errors, we took the mean of the offset across all satellites for the individual receivers 
and deducted the error from the measured Dopplers. This gave us a more accurate overlap 
between the predicted and measured Doppler frequencies. The figures below show Doppler 
correlation after removing the offset in a static scenario. 
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Figure 13. Doppler correlation for Satellite with PRN 6 
Figure 14. Doppler correlation for Satellite with PRN 9 
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The Doppler measurements and predictions are off by a few hertz at most. We can 
associate an acceptable tolerance around these errors to detect inconsistencies in Doppler 
frequency that exceed the tolerance. If the Spoofer does not adjust his spoofing frequency 
to the expected smoothly changing Doppler, we can use our Doppler frequency prediction 
algorithm with an appropriate threshold bound to detect such an attack. However, as 
mentioned earlier, the Doppler effect can be predicted by the Spoofer as well and 
incorporated into the Spoofed signal generator. Therefore, such a protection will be easily 
circumventable.  
To strengthen the protection, we explored the effect of the user velocity on the 
Doppler frequency. Since the Doppler is a function of the relative velocity between the 
receiver and the satellite, we incorporate uncertain motion on the receiver, which will be 
more difficult to predict by the Spoofer. 
4.4 Receiver Motion 
The receiver’s motion needs to be accurately determined to proceed with predicting its 
Doppler frequency. Most literatures use IMU’s (Inertial measurement units) to estimate the 
velocity of a moving body. The IMU consists of an accelerometer, magnetometer and a 
Gyroscope to estimate velocity and heading. The velocity is deduced by integrating the 
acceleration gotten from the accelerometer. This approach accumulates error very quickly 
and the velocity estimates are unusable within a few seconds. Most accurate digital 
speedometers and mobile applications utilize GPS for their speed estimation. Such tools 
would be rendered useless under a spoofing attack. The Spoofer could manipulate their 
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derived speeds and succeed in adjusting the fake signal frequency with the derived receiver 
speed. This way, the Spoofer will be able to circumvent detection. The Spoofer will be able 
to accurately calculate and incorporate the correct Doppler frequency into the Spoofed 
signal, causing the correlation between the Spoofed and predicted Doppler based on the 
ephemeris to be within tolerance. 
To address this, we made use of the OBD tool to acquire accurate digital speed from 
cars. Vehicles manufactured in the U.S since 1996 have an On-board diagnostics (OBD) 
port. This is a feature in the automotive industry that enables vehicles to report diagnostic 
and sensory information to vehicle owners and/or repair technicians. We made use of the 
OBDLink SX Scan Tool, which is an off-the shelf OBD communication tool. It enables 
communication with a vehicles on-board diagnostic computer, via rs-232 communication 
interface. We successfully acquired the vehicle odometer readings and injected it into our 
Doppler prediction algorithm. This gave us accurate Doppler predictions independent of 
GPS related sources. 
We tested our correlation algorithm of the predicted and the measured Doppler 
frequency from the Ublox receiver with the setup in a moving vehicle. We noticed there 
was much more noise introduced into the calculations, making the errors in measurement 
and prediction significantly higher. The Figures below show the Doppler correlation when 
in motion. 
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Figure 15. Satellite PRN 10 Doppler correlation in motion 
Figure 16. Satellite PRN 29 Doppler correlation in motion 
 43 
From Figures 15 and 16 the presence of noise in the measured and predicted Doppler is 
apparent and causes the correlation error to be significantly high at certain intervals. We 
suspected these errors to be due to the presence of noise in the Doppler readings from the 
Ublox receiver and the noise in the velocity readings from the odometer. To filter out this 
error, we designed a Kalman filter to model and minimize the dynamic and measurement 
noise present in the Doppler measurement. We choose the Kalman filter due to its ability 
to operate on very little system data and predict the noise in the system without having 
significant knowledge of the system model. The Kalman filter is a digital filter which filters 
noise present in a series of measurements (Toshak Singhal, 2012). We use a simple one-
dimensional model formulation and do not use a control signal. The standard state 
prediction equation of the Kalman filter is given below: 
?̂?𝑘 = 𝐴?̂?𝑘−1 + 𝐵𝑢𝑘 
?̂?𝑘 = 𝐴𝑧𝑘−1𝐴
𝑇 +  𝑄 
Where ?̂?𝑘 is the state estimate of the signal, A is the state transition matrix, ?̂?𝑘 is the 
probability estimate of the state which is a function of 𝑄 the process noise covariance and 
𝑢𝑘 is the control input. 
The Kalman filter gain parameter is given by 
𝐾𝐺 = ?̂?𝑘𝐻
𝑇(𝐻?̂?𝑘𝐻
𝑇 + 𝑅)−1 
The constants 𝐴, 𝐻 and 𝐵 are taken as 1 in a one-dimensional model as this and would 
be general form matrices for multidimensional models. 𝑅 represents the measurement noise 
covariance. 
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State estimate observational update is given as 
?̂?𝑘 =  ?̂?𝑘−1 + 𝐾𝐺(𝑧𝑘 − 𝐻?̂?𝑘−1) 
Error covariance update is given as 
𝑧𝑘 = (1 − 𝐾𝐺𝐻)𝑧𝑘−1 
The dynamic noise 𝑄 and measurement noise 𝑅 of the Kalman filter were tuned to give us 
the best filtering results. We tested our prediction algorithm at different times of day and 
weather conditions to confirm its accuracy across different environmental conditions that 
could affect the signal propagation. The satellite with the greatest prediction error after 
applying the Kalman filter was tested under different environmental conditions. The 
figures below show the measured and predicted Doppler frequency correlation for different 
weathers and times of day. 
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Figure 17 Satellite with PRN 10 at 9 am with a clear sky 
 
Figure 18 Satellite with PRN 10 at 1pm with a cloudy sky 
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Figure 19 Satellite with PRN 10 on at 12pm on a sunny day 
 
Figure 20 Satellite with PRN 10 at 9pm 
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The predictions were relatively constrained within an error range of 10 Hz, except 
for the reading in the cloudy weather, the reading was slightly more aberrant, and the error 
reached a difference of 20Hz at a time instance. However, this deviation was for the 
satellite with the most error between the predicted and the measured Doppler frequency. 
To get a more statistically sound result, we utilized the mean of the three satellites with the 
highest prediction error. This was used as the detection criteria for spoofing and non-
spoofing attacks. In Section 5, we determine an optimal detection threshold for identifying 
spoofing attacks. 
We were able to configure the OBD reader to retrieve the digital vehicle speed and 
incorporate it in the spoofing detection setup. The figures below show Doppler deviation 
based on live spoofing tests with a difference in the Spoofer generated Doppler and speed 
and our Doppler predictions based on the speed acquired from the moving vehicle through 
the OBD reader. 
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Figure 21 Satellite PRN 20 speed Doppler variation relationship 
Figure 22 Satellite PRN 32 speed Doppler variation relationship 
It could be seen that the greater the speed deviation between the Spoofer inferred and the 
actual speed reported by the OBD reader, the Doppler variations increased. The variations 
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vary for different satellites due to the effect of the direction of motion of the receiver and 
that of the GPS satellites. It can be deduced that satellite 20 had more component of its 
velocity in the direction of the receiver’s velocity than satellite 32.  With this, we could 
tailor our detection algorithm to report inconsistencies beyond an optimal threshold, which 
we deduce in section 5. 
To prevent the Spoofer from attacking the ephemeris, we setup a trusted receiver on a 
safe location assumed to be un-Spoofed. This receiver will receive the most updated and 
valid ephemeris information from each visible GPS satellite. We set up a Flask web server 
with the trusted receiver, which pushes the latest received ephemeris to a Github repository 
every few seconds. We setup another web server on our vulnerable setup, this server pulls 
the latest ephemeris from our updated Git repository and correlates it with the currently 
received ephemeris every 10 seconds. This enables our security approach to detect any sort 
of manipulation done to the ephemeris. Validating the ephemeris at the instance of the 
ephemeris update also helps us detect ongoing spoofing attacks where the Spoofer is not 
able to update the ephemeris in the time frame between he validation of the ephemeris by 
the secured receiver. In Section 5, we discuss the limits of the GPS-SDR-SIM and show 
the fastest the offline spoofing library can update and rebroadcast the spoofing signal 
according to real-time GPS signal properties. Figure 23 shows an overview of our security 
approach. 
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Figure 23 Spoofing detection overview 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this section, we conduct a series of verification tests to estimate the performance 
and limitations of the detection algorithm. We also explore the limitations and latency 
involved in generating Spoofed signals using the GPS-SDR-SIM opensource spoofing 
library. 
5.1 Spoofing Detection Analysis 
To verify the detection rate based on the mean deviation of the predicted Doppler 
frequency from the measured, we setup the Spoofer as described in section 3.2 with a 
specified route and velocity. We had the receiver spoofed along a generated route and the 
Doppler being reported did correspond to the direction and motion of the Spoofed route. 
The Doppler prediction was being calculated using the speed being measured by the OBD 
reader which was connected to the vehicle. We did a wide search for values of thresholds 
for the mean deviation between the measured and the predicted Doppler that could 
accurately detect a spoofing attack as true and ignore non-spoofed situations. We 
conducted the results for various routes and velocity offsets to demonstrate the robustness 
of the approach by taking different directions and speeds into consideration. While 
traversing these different routes, we were actively logging the Doppler variations across 
the satellites and comparing it to a series of thresholds and correspondingly deduce the 
optimal detection threshold with minimum false positives and maximum detection rate. 
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The figures below show the statistical detection rate and speed difference relationship when 
traversing a route from east-west , south-north and vice versa  
Figure 24 Google maps representation of east-west route 
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Figure 25 Detection rate for east-west route 
Figure 26 Google maps representation of north-south route 
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Figure 27 Detection rate for north-south route 
Figures 24 and 26 show the google maps representation of the routes utilized repeatedly 
during the tests to procure statistical data demonstrating the detection rate of the approach. 
From the Figures 25 and 27, the accuracy of the detection increases for the different 
thresholds as the speed difference between the predicted and actual speed increases. 
Beyond a speed difference of 5m/s, the detection is almost 100%. During our tests, we 
found a threshold of 13 to be a suitable detection threshold to indicate spoofing, at which 
we had no false positives based on Figure 28. From Figure 25, for a speed difference greater 
than 6m/s the detections were 100% accurate and the detection accuracy gradually decrease 
for lower speed differences. Figure 27 corresponding to the north-south route test, shows 
the accuracy to be slightly less for speed differences of 6m/s than for the east-west route. 
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Our approach is dependent on the response of the satellite to the receiver’s unpredictable 
motion. The greater the motion vectors align between the satellite and the receivers, the 
greater the Doppler frequency response and proportionally, our detection rate will rise. For 
the different routes, the relative motions between the receiver and the satellite were 
different and this yielded slightly different accuracies. However, for the heavily tested 
routes, the statistical results are reasonably close. 
5.2  False Positives and Threshold Selection 
We conducted tests to identify a suitable threshold to overcome false positives. 
The figure below shows the percentage of false positives detected for the various 
thresholds when the receiver was not being Spoofed. 
Figure 28 False positive detection rate for different thresholds 
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Figure 28 corresponds to the false detection rate for an unspoofed situation. The more 
accurate our prediction and filtering algorithm, the less false positives we would have at 
lower thresholds. For our approach, a threshold of 13 is selected as an upper bound to 
distinguish between authentic and Spoofed signals. Doppler measurements that deviate 
from the predicted Doppler by more than the upper bound would be classified as suspicious 
signals. The thresholds below 13 in Figures 25 and 27 do contain false positives when 
correlated with Figure 28, therefore we focus on the tightest threshold bound which ensures 
0 false alarms.   
5.3  Spoofing Limitations 
The GPS-SDR-SIM is an offline opensource GPS Signal simulation library being 
used to conduct the spoofing tests. This library is publicly accessible and successfully takes 
over and manipulates independent and integrated GPS receiver modules in cellphones and 
other GPS navigations systems. The library generates valid binary representation of GPS 
signals and requires ephemeris, time and path coordinates to generate the GPS signal. This 
binary file is passed on to a radio front-end such as the hackRF or the USRP to broadcast 
the fake signal in the electromagnetic spectrum. We compared the receiver extracted 
parameters from the broadcasted spoof signal, the ephemeris, time, velocity and 
coordinates matched very closely with the actual supplied parameters used in the 
generation of the fake signal originally. An updated version of the GPS-SDR-SIM includes 
a module which correctly predicts the Doppler frequency for the supplied parameters and 
generates the Spoofed signal with the correct Doppler frequency. Therefore, a Spoofer 
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making use of the GPS-SDR-SIM to spoof a non-moving receiver will succeed if the 
ephemeris used by the Spoofer is the latest updated ephemeris. If an older ephemeris is 
used, our ephemeris validation client will be able to detect this by correlating it with the 
trusted server serving the latest received ephemeris from each visible satellite that’s 
common between the two receivers. 
With motion involved and an auxiliary source such as the OBD reader, which is used to 
generate the Doppler prediction, a Spoofer must be capable of updating the spoof signal 
very closely with the monitored receiver motion. Here, we test the limits of the capability 
of the GPS-SDR-SIM to generate Spoofed signal files with changing receiver motion to 
circumvent the Doppler based spoofing detection. The GPS-SDR-SIM’s latency was tested 
by using the Intel Core i7 Quadcore 3.2 GHz processor with 8 GB of RAM as the 
underlying hardware, the hackRF as the SDR and the Ublox Neo M8T GNSS module as 
the test receiver. We tested the hardware to estimate the expected latency in updating the 
Spoofed signal with real-time signal and motion properties. We considered two parts of 
taking over the GPS receiver. 
5.3.1 Initial Take Over 
We tested the average time it took the Spoofer to take over the Ublox GPS receiver, 
when it was not locked onto any GPS signals. The Figure below shows the times to first 
fix on various trials. 
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Figure 29 Time to takeover GPS Receiver on a Warm start 
The average time it took the GPS receiver to lock onto the fake signal was 17.48 seconds 
and the minimum time it took was 14 seconds. We took over the receiver from a warm start 
state, when it was not locked to the Spoofed signal and had to reacquire and compute a 
PVT solution. This shows the GPS-SDR-SIM must generate a continuous Spoofed signal 
for at least 14 seconds to take over the receiver. 
5.3.2 Continuous Take Over 
Secondly, we assume a situation where the Spoofer has access to the real time 
velocity of the vehicle and attempts to utilize the GPS-SDR-SIM to make consecutive 
updates and broadcast Spoofed signal for enough length of time to keep the GPS receiver 
locked. We split a continuous Spoofed data file with updated velocities and wrote an 
automated script to continually switch the Spoofer through the updated parts to determine 
the minimum time it takes the receiver to reacquire each of the updated broadcasts. On 
switching to the next file, the receiver loses fix momentarily and reacquires it relatively 
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faster with the continuous signal since it was already fixed to the Spoofed signal. The 
receiver was able to lock faster because it was already fixed to the signal with valid 
satellites and needed to recompute the position and time alone. The figure below shows the 
times it took to reacquire the continuous signal. 
Figure 30 GPS time to reacquire fix on a hot start 
It took the GPS receiver an average of 7.3 seconds to lock onto the continuous 
spoofing signal and a minimum of 2.06 seconds. Also, it took the GPS-SDR-SIM 0.3 
seconds to generate a Spoofed signal for the duration of 2.06 seconds. This means the 
Spoofer must at least predict the vehicle velocity for 2.36 from the time it generates the 
fake signal to have a continuous aligned Doppler frequency. Within this latency period, 
the receiver vehicle has ample time to intentionally cause a velocity change and detect the 

























The GPS spoofing detection algorithm utilizes the Doppler property of GPS signals 
to detect spoofing attacks. Unlike most GPS spoofing detection procedures, our approach 
makes use of commercially available GPS receivers and is suitable for a scalable 
implementation.  The setup involves a Ublox Neo M8T GPS receiver which gives access 
to the GPS navigation message received by the receiver. The navigation message contains 
the ephemeris which can be used to predict the Doppler frequency of the GPS signal for 
each satellite. One of our contributions was the setup of a dual receiver ephemeris 
validation service based on a web server, which provides trusted ephemeris measurements 
for correlation with the ephemeris at the vulnerable receiver. We also explored the Doppler 
frequency of GPS signals and adapted an additional security measure which is dependent 
on the Doppler frequency at the GPS receiver. 
The Ublox receiver provides access to the raw Doppler frequency measurements 
derived by scanning the actual GPS signal codes in the acquisition phase. We were able to 
predict the Doppler very closely for both static and mobile cases. A less advanced Spoofer 
that does not account for the expected Doppler frequency when generating the spoofing 
signal, can be detected with this approach. However, the GPS-SDR-SIM does include a 
module that correctly incorporates the Doppler effect in the frequency of the fake signal. 
Therefore, a spoofing attack with the GPS-SDR-SIM would be able to circumvent a basic 
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Doppler correlation-based detection. Thus, we further studied the variation in the Doppler 
effect caused by the change in the speed of the user. We introduced the OBD reader, which 
is compatible with all modern cars manufactured from 1996 to extract accurate user 
velocity. We predicted the Doppler frequency by using motion parameters obtained by the 
OBD reader, which is independent of GPS signals. We were able to show that dynamic 
measurable motion in the receiver affects the Doppler frequency and for the Spoofer to 
succeed in spoofing, it must be able to update the generated signal with a close prediction 
of the receiver motion in real-time. Expanding on this, we designed our approach to be 
based on the dynamic nature of a moving vehicle’s velocity over time. By purposely 
causing a speed change in the moving vehicle, we were able to show the detectability of 
the spoofing attack based on the error in the speed incorporated by the Spoofer. Even for a 
more informed Spoofer that can accurately measure our speed, we showed limitations of 
the GPS-SDR-SIM to real-time updates. The GPS-SDR-SIM was tested for the expected 
latency in updating the broadcasted signal. We showed that, an automated attack with the 
current state of the GPS-SDR-SIM is expected to be delayed by at least 2.36 seconds. This 
is ample time for a moving vehicle to change its velocity and make its motion pattern 
unpredictable. Most commercially available vehicles have an average maximum 
acceleration of 4.5𝑚/𝑠2 (Barricella, 2001). This implies the capability of a speed change of  
26.8 𝑚/𝑠 in 6 seconds. Based on this an average car user can cause enough velocity change 
to make the Doppler adaptation for the Spoofer difficult. 
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